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Court Case Record DAVID S. ROSEN vs. CAR CREDIT 1ST INCORPORATED & others 2013-J-0282 UID(dc70)


DAVID S. ROSEN vs. CAR CREDIT 1ST INCORPORATED & others Court Case Record

Court Case Number: 2013-J-0282


 
Case Number2013-J-0282
Case TitleDAVID S. ROSEN vs. CAR CREDIT 1ST INCORPORATED & others
Case TypeCivil
StateMassachusetts, MA
CountyHampden
CourtHampden Superior Court
Court Address
Phone
Field Date07/05/2013
Close Date08/07/2013

Parties

CounselNameType
Judd L. Peskin, EsquireDavid S. RosenPlaintiff/Petitioner
Car Credit 1st IncorporatedDefendant
Richard Morrissey, EsquireFDAS Corp.Defendant/Respondent
Frank V. DecaroDefendant
Richard Morrissey, EsquireAnthony ScibelliDefendant/Respondent
DOCKET ENTRIES
Entry Date Paper Entry Text
07/05/2013 #1 Petition pursuant to M.G.L. c. 231, § 118 with attachments, filed by David S. Rosen. ^
07/05/2013 #2 RE#1: Action on the petition is stayed pending the trial court's disposition of the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner is to file a status report on or before 8/5/13 as to the motion for reconsideration. *Notice/Attest/McDonough, J.
07/11/2013 #3 Status report, filed by David S. Rosen. ^
07/11/2013 #4 RE#2: No action necessary. Status report remains due 8/5/13. *Notice.
08/05/2013 Status report, filed by David S. Rosen. ^
08/07/2013 ORDER: The plaintiff, David S. Rosen, has filed a petition seeking interlocutory review, pursuant to G.L. c. 231, §. 118 (first para.), of the Superior Court's order on his motion for default judgment, entered on June 5, 2013. Action on the petition was stayed pending the result of a motion for reconsideration filed in the trial court. As that motion has been denied, the stay is vacated. In his petition, the plaintiff seeks review of the assessment of damages on three of the counts against the defaulted defendants. To the extent that the petitioner is seeking reversal of the Superior Court's order, the petition is denied because the single justice is without authority to grant the relief requested, which would be outcome determinative. See Mass.R.A.P. 15(c). The plaintiff's petition further requests that the single justice grant him leave to take an interlocutory appeal from the order allowing the motion to remove the default. Leave to take an interlocutory appeal should be reserved for truly extraordinary and exceptional cases. See Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 387-389 (2000) (discussing "the appellate courts' traditional abhorrence of piecemeal appellate review"). The plaintiff has not made a persuasive showing in this case for overriding the strong judicial policy against piecemeal interlocutory appeals. The request for leave to take an interlocutory appeal is denied. All relief requested in the petition is denied. So ordered. (Vuono, J.) *Notice/Attest/McDonough, J. Footnote: (1) FDAS Corp.; Frank v. Decaro; and Anthony Scibelli.